

Leaders' Committee

Independent Peer Challenge: Item no: 4
London local government's
collective resilience arrangements

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Summary: London Councils commissioned an independent peer challenge in autumn 2017, focusing on the extent to which boroughs' collaborative resilience arrangements – recently strengthened by the EP2020 Prospectus - continue to provide assurance and to identify ways in which the collective arrangements can be further strengthened. This followed a discussion amongst Leaders of these issues in July 2017.

Tom Riordan, Chief Executive of Leeds City Council, and Mary Ney, former Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Greenwich, were commissioned to conduct the peer challenge. Their report is attached as Appendix B. Tom Riordan and Mary Ney will attend Leaders' Committee.

Eleanor Kelly, Chief Executive of the London borough of Southwark, has also been invited to attend the meeting to represent the London Resilience Local Authorities' Panel (which will have manegerial oversight of the peer review's implementation).

Recommendations: Leaders' Committee is asked to:

1. Endorse the report's recommendations for strengthening resilience and emergency preparedness across London's local authorities.
2. Agree that the London Resilience Local Authorities' Panel will oversee implementation of the recommendations.
3. Agree that the Panel will prepare a progress report for Leaders' Committee, early in 2019.

Independent Peer Challenge:

London local government's collective resilience arrangements

1. During 2016/17, London local government undertook work to review and strengthen its Emergency Planning capacity. The outcome of the work – the Emergency Planning (EP) 2020 Prospectus – set out ways in which both individual and collaborative resilience arrangements between boroughs could be strengthened.
2. In the course of 2017 London local government's collective arrangements were tested by a range of incidents. Given the cumulative significance of these, London Councils commissioned an independent peer challenge focusing on the extent to which boroughs' collaborative resilience arrangements – recently strengthened by the EP2020 Prospectus - continue to provide assurance and to identify ways in which collective arrangements can be further strengthened. This followed a discussion amongst Leaders of these issues in July 2017. The terms of reference are attached as Appendix A
3. Tom Riordan, Chief Executive of Leeds City Council, and Mary Ney, former Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Greenwich, were commissioned by London Councils to conduct the peer challenge. Their report is attached as Appendix B.

Background

4. The London Local Government resilience arrangements are rooted in the Civil Contingencies legislation, the wider London Resilience architecture and arrangements agreed between London's 32 borough councils and the City of London Corporation. Those latter arrangements include the London Local Authority Gold Rota, the support of the London Resilience Group and the London Local Authority Co-ordination Centre – based within London Fire Brigade – the oversight of the Local Authority Panel and the existence of the Gold Resolution, agreed to by all 33 London authorities via formal resolution.
5. The established local authority co-operation arrangements are underpinned by the local authority Gold resolution which was adopted individually by all London boroughs and the City in 2006¹. The arrangements were subsequently enhanced to encompass mutual aid agreements, with the approval of individual boroughs and Leaders' Committee in 2010.
6. The London-wide work is overseen from a managerial perspective by the London Resilience Forum Local Authorities' Panel (LAP), which includes the lead borough Chief Executives for each Sub-Regional Resilience Forum. The Panel is chaired by John

¹ The resolution, promoted by London Councils, replaced an earlier resolution adopted in 2004

Barradell, Chief Executive of the City of London.

7. These arrangements have much strength and have served London and London local government well over many years and through numerous incidents that have had to be managed, including terrorist attacks, severe weather, flooding and other extreme weather, industrial action, the outbreak of contagious diseases and a range of other disasters and incidents.
8. In 2016/17 the Local Authorities' Panel undertook review activity about the nature of borough Emergency Planning capacity in the light of various changes in recent years, including resourcing constraints. The EP2020 Prospectus set out an agenda for continued Resilience focus and stronger clustering and collaboration at sub-regional level between boroughs. This was reported to Leaders' Committee in February 2017. The Local Authorities' Panel and individual boroughs subsequently put a series of work streams in train to begin implementation of EP2020.
9. During 2017, the London arrangements – and in particular the London local authority contribution to those arrangements – were tested by:
 - The Westminster Bridge terrorist attack in March.
 - The knock on impact of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack in May and the subsequent move to the 'Critical' level of alert.
 - The terrorist attacks at Borough Market/London Bridge in early June.
 - The Grenfell Tower Fire in mid-June.
 - The terrorist attack near Finsbury Park Mosque on 19th June.
 - The consequences of fire safety testing and reviews on high blocks flowing from the Grenfell Fire tragedy and the evacuation of four tower blocks in Camden on 23rd June.
 - The terrorist attack on a tube train near Parsons Green terrorist on 15 September 2017
10. In Following a discussion amongst Leaders on these matters, London Councils commissioned an independent peer review, on behalf of London local government, to inform a reflection on the effectiveness of the collective resilience arrangements within the context of London's wider resilience architecture.

Next Steps

11. London local authority stakeholders, including Leaders and chief executives - will want to reflect on the peer challenge review and how existing collective arrangements could be strengthened.

12. Following an initial consideration by Leaders' Committee, it is proposed that the Local Authority Panel considers each of the recommendations in turn. This work will form the basis of a detailed implementation plan, which the Panel will use to drive a programme of work in collaboration with all London local authorities.
13. Eleanor Kelly, Chief Executive of the London borough of Southwark, has been invited to attend Leaders' Committee to discuss the London Resilience Local Authorities' Panel's work to support the agreed implementation.
14. Leaders may wish to call for a progress report from the Panel on the overall programme to strengthen London local government's resilience arrangements in early 2019. In the interim, The

Leaders' Committee is asked to:

1. Endorse the recommendations for strengthening resilience and emergency preparedness across London's local authorities.
2. Commission the London Resilience Local Authorities' Panel to oversee implementation of the recommendations
3. Commission the Panel to prepare a progress report for Leaders' Committee, early in 2019.

Financial implications for London Councils

No immediate implications.

Legal implications for London Councils

Work to consider a potential refresh of the Gold Resolution and Addendum will necessitate legal advice

Equalities implications for London Councils

None

Attachments

Appendix A: The Independent Peer Challenge's terms of reference.

Appendix B: Report: London Local Government's Collective Resilience Arrangements – Independent Peer Challenge Review Report.

Terms of Reference

London Local Government's Collective Resilience Arrangements –Independent Peer Challenge

Introduction

The collective resilience arrangements of London's 33 local authorities – London local government - have many strengths and have served London and London local government well over many years and through numerous incidents ranging from terrorist attacks to severe weather.

During 2016/17, the Local Authorities' Panel of the London Resilience Partnership undertook review activity focusing on the nature of borough Emergency Planning capacity in the light of various developments in recent years, including significant resourcing constraints. This work – the Emergency Planning (EP) 2020 Prospectus – set out an agenda for strengthening collaborative resilience arrangements among boroughs.

In the course of 2017 London local government's collective arrangements were tested by a range of incidents including:

- the terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge in March;
- the wider impact of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack in May;
- the terrorist attack at Borough Market/London Bridge in early June;
- the Grenfell Tower Fire in mid June;
- the terrorist attack near Finsbury Park Mosque in June;
- the evacuation of residents from four tower blocks in Camden following fire safety testing in late June;
- the terrorist attack on a tube train near Parsons Green in September.

Given the cumulative significance of these events, London local government wishes to review the extent to which its EP2020 Prospectus continues to provide assurance about its contribution to wider London resilience and to identify ways in which collective arrangements can be further strengthened.

Key areas of focus

The review activity will be undertaken by an independent peer challenge. Its key focus is set out in the paragraphs below.

In the context of the statutory framework and incidents in London between March and June 2017:

- to what degree do EP2020's recommendations continue to offer assurance as a basis for London local government's contribution to wider London resilience arrangements?
- how clear is the understanding of London local government's collective resilience arrangements by all partners – including members and officers – and, in particular, the role and responsibilities of London Local Authority Gold and other partners?
- does the Gold Resolution and Addendum – agreed by all London local authorities – continue to be fit for purpose?

- what mutual expectations should London local government have of its constituent parts in its collective work to contribute to London's resilience?
- how effectively is London local government working with its key resilience partners and others in making its collective contribution to London's resilience.

The peer challenge is focused on London local government's *collective* arrangements, working with other partners, to support London's overall resilience. It will consider this in the context of the EP2020 Prospectus and the degree to which, given the experience of a range of incidents during 2017, that continues to provide assurance about London local government's collective work. It will not focus on the performance of any individual authority, nor will it seek to cover the same territory that is being examined by specifically constituted debriefing exercises and inquiries into particular incidents.

Conduct

This work will be an independent peer challenge led by Tom Riordan, Chief Executive of Leeds City Council and supported by Mary Ney, former Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Greenwich. They will conduct a range of discussions and interview and review relevant documentation.

A report will be submitted to the Local Authorities' Panel and the London Councils Leaders' Committee in early 2018.

London Local Government's Collective Resilience Arrangements

Independent Peer Challenge

**Report for
London Councils Leaders' Committee
6 February 2018**

**Tom Riordan and Mary Ney
January 2018**

Executive Summary

Introduction:

1. This independent peer challenge was commissioned in October 2017 by the London Councils Leaders' Committee who wanted an independent view about the arrangements that underpin London Local Government's collaborative resilience work. The peer challenge had an agreed scope in light of the unprecedented challenges faced between March and September 2017.
2. The focus of the work was fitness of the collective response, not individual borough arrangements. Leaders and directly elected mayors were keen to be proactive, check robustness and lead improvements to provide assurance for regional and national partners, and the public.

Background:

3. Document review and fieldwork took place between October and December 2017, with the peer challenge team listening to more than 40 stakeholders (councillors, chief executives, senior directors, emergency planning staff and key resilience partners). This included the voluntary and faith group leaders who are part of the regional arrangements. Direct engagement with community groups in individual localities was beyond the specification set by London Councils and the Local Authorities' Panel, which essentially focussed on the technical arrangements that underpin London local government's collaborative resilience work. We would, of course, expect to see engagement with the voluntary and community sector as part of the broader conversations which will inform action planning being taken forward by the London Resilience Partnership in response to a range of incidents during 2017. The peer challenge team were careful not to stray into issues that are the subject of other inquiries and investigations. The package of recommendations should be reviewed as further information emerges from the other inquiries, from engagement with community groups and partners, and from the regular debrief process.
4. The peer challenge team was led by Tom Riordan (Chief Executive of Leeds City Council) and Mary Ney (Former Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Greenwich), supported by Mariana Pexton (Chief Officer Strategy and Improvement, Leeds City Council). The peer challenge team are grateful for the response to their request for engagement and for the support provided by colleagues throughout the fieldwork.
5. The legislative framework for the local authority role in civil protection is clear through the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004. The collaborative resilience arrangements in London were initiated following the 9/11 attacks in the US and have been developed and improved in subsequent years, particularly in preparation for the 2012 Olympics. The set-up is unique in embedding arrangements across the 32 London Boroughs and the City of London in what are termed the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) Arrangements and the Gold Resolution. This gives power and authority to LLAG to act on behalf of London Local Government in certain circumstances, enabling boroughs to work together and to provide a single voice and conduit for other responders. These collective

arrangements have been activated successfully on a number of occasions since 2004, for example, in response to terrorist attacks and severe weather events.

Findings:

6. The peer challenge found that the London boroughs respond to hundreds of incidents each year, largely managed very effectively every day at borough level or with locally arranged support. Examples include: unexploded world war bombs, community tension issues, and flooding. The peer challenge found evidence of a significant amount of activity across London in recent years to continuously improve the arrangements.
7. The volume, range, and nature of incidents experienced in London between March and September 2017 highlighted the need for this peer challenge to check fitness and consistency of the collective arrangements in the ever changing resilience challenge. The close timing of the terrorist attacks, plus the scale and consequences of the human tragedy together with the rehousing challenge presented by the Grenfell Tower Fire, placed additional pressure on the resilience arrangements and a “community” perspective beyond that which most councils have ever experienced. The peer review team heard from several stakeholders that the Grenfell Tower Fire had undermined confidence in vital elements of London Local Government’s collective resilience arrangements. Many of the recommendations are intended to address these issues and help restore confidence.
8. The peer challenge found a strong ethos and history of collaboration between boroughs, together with a clear recognition that the context and nature of incidents is changing. A Review of resilience arrangements was undertaken by London Local Government in 2016 (known as EP2020). It highlighted inconsistencies between boroughs, and issues of capacity and loss of experience. EP2020 contained a range of recommendations that are in the process of implementation. This peer challenge endorses this improvement work and makes further recommendations to build on EP2020 in light of the further experiences and learning during 2017.
9. There was widespread pride in keeping London safe and a concern that Londoners should not be failed in this regard. Stakeholders welcomed the peer challenge as a timely and helpful approach. Like the Lord Harris Review in 2016, this peer challenge found considerable support for London Local Government’s collective arrangements. However, the peer challenge found scope for further clarity in some plans, procedures and roles, and in line with EP2020 findings, some stakeholders also reported inconsistency in the effectiveness of borough arrangements, concerns over capacity and loss of experience in leadership and technical expertise. In particular there was concern that the current triggers and scope for LLAG to be activated did not enable a sufficiently speedy intervention in situations where the recovery phase appeared not to be working effectively, which is what many interviewees reported was experienced in response to the Grenfell Tower Fire.
10. The events of 2017, especially the scale and nature of the Grenfell Tower Fire, the almost permanently heightened security threat and London’s continued role as a global city and the UK capital, underline the importance of all council leaders directly elected

mayors and chief executives prioritising investment of time and resources and their direct engagement with resilience and emergency planning. All boroughs need to ensure that they have a culture where “resilience is everyone’s business”, enabling boroughs to establish and maintain organisation wide ownership, so that the broader workforce can be readily and rapidly deployed in response and recovery.

11. The peer challenge identified a series of themes outlined in the Report, which have informed the recommendations. They fall under the following headings: EP2020; an assurance framework; role of the Mayor of London; role of council leaders, directly elected mayors and local councillors; community and communications context; supporting victims and survivors; mutual aid; Local Authority Gold and the Gold Resolution; working with resilience partners; and councils as the “fourth” emergency service.

Conclusion:

12. In conclusion the peer challenge team was impressed by the strong commitment and the openness to ongoing learning and improvement, but there needs to be an assurance that this extends to all boroughs more consistently. The London Local Government collective resilience arrangements operate in a dynamic, complex and often testing environment and they have evolved over time in response to experience in exercising and in live incidents. The arrangements form a sound basis for further development and implementing this package of recommendations with pace will enable London Local Government to provide a more robust assurance about their collective arrangements. In particular, this will include an annual assurance report and operating more effectively via the Gold Resolution in exceptional cases where the situation demands it.
13. Crucially, all partners need to ensure that plans and procedures are simple, clear, and therefore more accessible to those who are not experts in resilience but vital in an emergency.
14. Finally, in light of the outcome of further debriefs, the various inquiries and from further community engagement, it will be important to review and enhance the implementation plan developed in light of this peer challenge, to ensure that all lessons are learned from the events of 2017.

Recommendations:

Recommendation 1 – Refresh EP2020 to incorporate the work of the independent peer challenge, into an agreed **implementation plan**. Council leaders, directly elected mayors and chief executives should provide clear leadership for resilience (including through active engagement in training and exercising) to ensure the effectiveness of arrangements in all boroughs for even the most significant test and thereby provide a robust annual assurance to regional and national partners and in turn the public.

Recommendation 2 – Reaffirm the Local Authorities’ Panel (LAP) and Implementation Group as the accountable body to drive the refreshed EP2020 Implementation Plan with the immediate priority of **clarifying, simplifying and strengthening the sub-regional**

arrangements with the lead chief executive for each area being more widely recognised and supported by a central support capacity.

Recommendation 3 – Draw together existing work to develop and implement a clear **assurance framework** to set expected and consistent standards at borough and regional levels, across all relevant aspects, and provide an annual assurance report to regional and national partners. Utilise peer challenge and improvement partner arrangements to ensure all boroughs operate to a high and consistent standard with the right level of capacity and capability.

Recommendation 4 – Ensure boroughs recognise the importance of community resilience and have **clear community engagement and liaison plans** in place, with strong relationships across each sector, that are well connected to emergency plans. Ensure that boroughs understand the impact of incidents (both local and other) on their communities. Test the robustness of these plans and arrangements locally with key community and faith groups.

Recommendation 5. Ensure learning from the experiences of the humanitarian and welfare response in 2017 provided to **victims and survivors** by reviewing current plans and exercising, including: the robustness of the initial response; arrangements for longer term response; information sharing; a consistent approach to case management; role of the key worker; achieving consistency of service over a prolonged period; specialist skills; clear well understood and published arrangements for a standing charity for effective collection and distribution to those affected by tragedies; and co-ordination across agencies.

Recommendation 6 – Formally recognise in plans the **role of Mayor of London as the voice of London and Londoners**, and his strategic role in relation to civil protection rather than having a direct operational role. Ensure that there is awareness and understanding of these roles and responsibilities, documented in plans and tested through exercising, as well as effective two way communications in incident response and recovery.

Recommendation 7 – Develop and **agree the role of leaders, directly elected mayors and local councillors** in preparedness (including an assurance role through Scrutiny and Audit Committees) and in response and recovery (including a community leadership role rather than a direct operational role). Engage councillors in developing these roles. Leaders and directly elected mayors need to be involved in supporting the role of LLAG, when appropriate, and in exercising.

Recommendation 8 – Enhance the **mutual aid policy** (which is underpinned by the memorandum of understanding) covering both front line resources and senior expert support so it works more effectively in practice on a more consistent and coordinated basis. These documents need to set out collective problem solving and resource sharing as the default approach, and be well exercised (including major incidents, unannounced table top exercises and sustained recovery periods), be better understood by partners and go beyond the London boundary.

Recommendation 9 – Refresh the Gold Resolution and Addendum at the earliest opportunity to make triggers and the **escalation process** clearer, so that there is a clear

mandated process in the extreme circumstances that demand it. Use the role of the LAP chair (and engagement with relevant members of London Councils' Executive) to facilitate speedy "intervention" in those exceptional cases (for example, when a borough needs help but does not request it).

Recommendation 10 – Engage with LRF to **simplify joint plans and ensure effective support arrangements between blue light partners and boroughs**. Recommend that the LLAG reduce the categories of scenarios: borough incident, borough incident with London wide implications, and an incident affecting more than one borough over several days or even weeks. This would enable plans to be better understood by people not expert in resilience but vital in an emergency.

Recommendation 11 – Engage **central government departments** to secure a single and efficient point of contact through the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) for headline data and communication and for quick response funding such as Bellwin. Use this peer challenge to provide an impetus to share the good work being done across London Local Government and the learning from 2017 (for example, information sharing), to collaborate outside the capital and influence national policy and the local government sector.

Introduction:

1. This independent peer challenge was commissioned in October 2017 by the London Councils Leaders' Committee who wanted an independent view about the arrangements that underpin London Local Government's collaborative resilience work. The peer challenge had an agreed scope to cover the following five key questions in light of the unprecedented challenges faced between March and September 2017.
 - To what degree do the Emergency Planning Review 2020 (EP2020) recommendations continue to offer assurance as a basis for London local government's contribution to wider London resilience arrangements?
 - How clear is the understanding of London local government's collective resilience arrangements by all partners – including members and officers – and, in particular, the roles and responsibilities of London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) and other partners?
 - Does the Gold Resolution and Addendum – agreed by all London local authorities – continue to be fit for purpose?
 - What mutual expectations should London local government have of its constituent parts in its collective work to contribute to London's resilience?
 - How effectively is London local government working with its key resilience partners and others in making its collective contribution to London's resilience?
2. Leaders and directly elected mayors were keen to be proactive, check robustness and lead improvements to provide an assurance for key regional and national partners, and the public. The focus of the work was the fitness of the collective response and not on individual borough arrangements. In relation to events in 2017, this was not a forensic study of what occurred, but rather a process to listen to lessons from recent events to help strengthen the collaborative arrangements in the future.
3. Document review and fieldwork took place between October and December 2017, with the peer challenge team listening to more than 40 stakeholders (councillors, chief executives, senior directors, emergency planning staff and key resilience partners). Engagement included learning from Manchester, as part of the 100 Resilient Cities network. The peer review team also included the voluntary and faith group leaders who are part of the regional arrangements. Direct engagement with community groups in individual localities was beyond the specification set by London Councils and the Local Authorities' Panel, which essentially focussed on the technical arrangements that underpin London Local Government's collaborative resilience work. We would, of course, expect to see engagement with the voluntary and community sector as part of the broader conversations which will inform action planning being taken forward by the London Resilience Partnership in response to a range of incidents during 2017.
4. The peer challenge team were careful not to stray into issues that are the subject of other inquiries and investigations. The package of recommendations should be reviewed as further information emerges from those inquiries, from engagement with community groups and partners, and from the regular debrief process.
5. The peer challenge team was led by Tom Riordan (Chief Executive of Leeds City Council) and Mary Ney (Former Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Greenwich), supported by Mariana Pexton (Chief Officer Strategy and Improvement, Leeds City Council). The peer challenge team are grateful for the response to their request for engagement and

for the support provided by colleagues throughout the fieldwork. Appendix 1 includes a summary of documents reviewed, appendix 2 lists the range of stakeholders engaged. Appendix 3 contains the peer review team biographies with a brief focus on their credentials for this task.

Background:

6. The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 names local authorities as a “Category 1 responder” within the framework for civil protection in the UK, i.e. those organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies (the emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responder duties include:
 - assessing the risk of emergencies occurring to inform contingency planning;
 - putting in place emergency plans and business continuity management arrangements;
 - warning, informing and advising the public in the event of an emergency;
 - sharing information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;
 - co-operating with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and
 - providing advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management.
7. Category 2 organisations (for example: the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies) are ‘co-operating bodies’. Category 1 and Category 2 responders come together to form “local resilience forums” (LRFs) to help with co-ordination and co-operation between responders at the local level. The London Resilience Forum (LRF), fulfils this role at the regional level, with a set of multi-agency plans, a training and exercising programme and a Strategic Coordination Protocol setting out the shared expectations.
8. The collaborative resilience arrangements in London were initiated following the 9/11 attacks in the US and have been developed and improved in subsequent years, particularly in preparation for the 2012 Olympics. The set-up is unique in embedding arrangements across the 32 London Boroughs and the City of London in what are termed the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) Arrangements and the Gold Resolution. This gives power and authority to LLAG to act on behalf of London Local Government in certain circumstances, enabling boroughs to work together and to provide a single voice and conduit for other responders. These collective arrangements have been activated successfully on a number of occasions since 2004, for example, in response to terrorist attacks and severe weather events.
9. Boroughs respond to hundreds of different incidents and events each year and these are managed very effectively every day at borough level or with locally arranged mutual aid. Examples range from: unexploded world war bombs, community tension, surface water flooding, power outage, high pressure water main bursts, gas leaks, dangerous structures and chemical incidents relating to the production of illicit drugs. As part of a service monitoring programme boroughs reported a total of 655 incidents occurred between 1st September 2015 and 31st August 2016. This equates to just under 20 per borough per year and is in addition to the normal business of lower level call outs. This high level of incidents throughout the year across London Local Government means that

arrangements are regularly used in live incidents at borough level and this assists with readiness for larger scale incidents.

10. The peer challenge also heard about the range of incidents where the LLAG arrangements have been deployed effectively following their development in the aftermath of 9/11. This included, for example: 2004 Tsunami- large scale identification and repatriation issues, London's response to the 7/7 bombings, the radiation poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko, swine flu in 2009, multiple occasions of industrial action, the 2010 volcano eruption in Iceland, severe snow in 2009/10, summer disorder in 2011, murder of Lee Rigby in 2013, Croydon flooding in 2014, Croydon tram derailment in 2016 and Westminster and London Bridge terror incidents in 2017. Additionally, the LLAG principles were used to good effect during the 2012 Olympics to support the safe and successful delivery of the Games. Additional practical descriptions of LLAG operations are attached in Appendix 4.

11. There is evidence of a significant amount of activity across London to review and improve plans and to regularly exercise partnership arrangements at both borough level and collectively. A Review of resilience arrangements was undertaken by London Local Government in 2016 (known as EP2020), which highlighted inconsistencies between boroughs together with issues of capacity and loss of experience. EP2020 contained a range of recommendations, with the Local Authorities' Panel (LAP) and LAP Implementation Group being responsible for driving implementation, which has been affected by the operational demands of 2017:
 - Establish a corporate resource of professional advice, support and oversight, where not already established, to support authorities to withstand increasing pressures and ensure chief executives have ready access to high quality corporate advice and support in their localities;
 - Strengthen collaborative working to better utilise experience, knowledge and expertise;
 - Support a more cost effective and efficient service;
 - Increase opportunities to share scarce resource;
 - Create a more robust Duty London Local Authority Gold arrangement which will further complement our leadership on resilience role and participation at the heart of London strategic coordination;
 - Establish a more robust and meaningful assurance process to improve corporate oversight.

12. All these developments have helped to meet the changing nature of challenges, and the terrorist threat in particular. This peer challenge endorses this improvement work, which has been impacted by the operational demands of incident response and recovery in 2017. The peer review makes further recommendations to build on EP2020, in light of the experience of 2017, and LAP will need to ensure that there is capacity to deliver the changes. As a reminder, the unprecedented and diverse range of incidents in a short period included:
 - the terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge in March;
 - the wider impact of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack in May;
 - the terrorist attack at Borough Market/London Bridge in early June;
 - the Grenfell Tower Fire in mid-June;
 - the terrorist attack near Finsbury Park Mosque in June;
 - the evacuation of residents from four tower blocks in Camden following fire safety testing in late June; and
 - the terrorist attack on a tube train near Parsons Green in September.

13. The volume, range, and nature of incidents experienced in 2017 highlighted the need for this peer challenge to check fitness and consistency of the collective arrangements in the current dynamic resilience climate. The close timing of the terrorist attacks, plus the scale and consequences of the human tragedy together with the rehousing challenge presented by the Grenfell Tower Fire, placed additional pressure on the resilience arrangements and a “community” perspective beyond that which most councils have ever experienced. The peer review team heard from several stakeholders that the Grenfell Tower Fire had undermined confidence in some vital elements of London Local Government’s collective resilience arrangements. Many of the recommendations are intended to address these issues and restore confidence.
14. The context of local government, not just London, has changed in recent years, not least with the impact of sustained austerity affecting its capacity, but also with the demographic, social and economic changes in local communities meaning different dynamics in local communities and placing additional demand pressures on councils. The changing models of service delivery, such as outsourcing, partnering and commissioning, also affects the resilience arrangements of councils, with less direct control over some services. The continually evolving nature of incidents that arise, the social media dynamic and the global context, all place additional pressures on the full range of Category 1 responders in the Civil Contingencies Act, meaning that strong and collaborative partnerships are more crucial than ever to help with a clear intelligence picture, strong partnerships and effective communications.
15. The additional dynamic of London being the capital city, home to so many national bodies, large and diverse, with a range of governance arrangements, can serve to make things complex in terms of being “prepared” for incidents, having effective “response” arrangements and ensuring effective and sustained “recovery” plans are delivered. In a complex system like this, any arrangements need to be of a consistent standard of excellence across organisations which can be challenging when the range of tests is so dynamic and significant. The changing nature of incidents is also demanding and makes the borough role important because of the importance of community engagement and strong relationships that can help at a time of crisis.
16. The national context is also important, with the ambition to learn from events in order to improve the response. The Cabinet Office (CO) and the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) have key roles in this, with both working on policy developments across Whitehall, that are timely in relation to this peer challenge, for example: including Resilience Direct, Resilience Standards, better sharing of lessons learned and Victim Support. The Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE) and the Local Government Association (LGA) also have key roles in supporting the sector through work on guidance and training that they are refreshing.


Findings:

17. The peer challenge found a strong ethos and history of collaboration between boroughs, together with a clear recognition that the context and nature of incidents is changing. The 2016 review, EP2020 (described in para 11) was clearly an important piece of work.

This independent peer challenge endorses that work and makes further recommendations to build on EP2020 in light of more recent experience and in particular to ensure that London Local Government is well prepared and able to respond effectively to the full range of challenges.

18. There was widespread pride in keeping London safe and a concern that Londoners should not be failed in this regard. Stakeholders welcomed the peer challenge as a timely and helpful approach. Like the Lord Harris Review in 2016, this peer challenge found considerable support for London Local Government's collective arrangements. However, the peer review heard of scope for further clarity in some plans, procedures and roles, and in line with EP2020 findings some stakeholders also reported inconsistency in the effectiveness of borough arrangements, concerns over capacity and loss of experience in leadership and technical expertise,. In particular there was concern that the current triggers and scope for LLAG to be activated did not enable a sufficiently speedy intervention in situations where the recovery phase appeared not to be working effectively, which is what stakeholders reported was experienced in response to the Grenfell Tower Fire.
19. The events of 2017, especially the scale and nature of the Grenfell Tower Fire, the almost permanently heightened security threat and London's continued role as a global city and the UK capital, underline the importance of all council leaders, directly elected mayors and chief executives prioritising investment of time and resources and their direct engagement with resilience and emergency planning. All boroughs need to ensure that they have a culture where "resilience is everyone's business", so that the broader workforce can be deployed in readily and rapidly in response and recovery, ensuring that plans and procedures are simple and clear, and therefore accessible to the members, the general workforce and the community. It is generally the borough that will have lead responsibility for recovery, as can be seen in the attached diagram, with effective handover from response to recovery being crucial.

Response and recovery lead roles



20. The peer challenge focused on five key questions outlined in para 1. The work identified the following themes which are the subject of discussion and recommendations to help the further development of London Local Government's collective resilience arrangements.


- a. **EP2020.** The peer challenge found EP2020 to be clear and comprehensive and it is important that all boroughs continue to support its implementation being driven by the Local Authorities' Panel (LAP). The understanding of emergency planning capability and capacity is very helpful for the forward planning of activity. There is a need to further clarify, simplify and strengthen the sub-regional arrangements and engage a broader range of senior managers in supporting preparedness, exercising and training in order to deal with concerns on capacity. Greater Manchester provides a good example of a chief officer group actively engaged in providing leadership direction and support to emergency planning colleagues. Resilience and emergency planning needs to be a regular agenda item for council leaders, directly elected mayors and chief executives in London, to ensure a culture of resilience remains at the forefront of organisational thinking and resources across boroughs can be deployed quickly and effectively in emergencies. Strong borough arrangements need to be the cornerstone of the collective arrangements, with guarantees on a range of issues such as an effective initial 24 hour response, relevant staff being security vetted, learning lessons from incidents, business continuity and connections to other key areas such as community safety and community engagement.
- b. **Assurance Framework.** Existing measures should be further developed and brought together in a single Assurance Framework with regular reporting, because this is crucial in achieving greater consistency across boroughs to enable collaboration and sharing of resources. Boroughs need the right level of capacity and capability. An annual assurance report should be used to help secure the confidence of key regional and national partners, with the first being published to the LRF in 2018. The Assurance Framework should explicitly link to the requirements of the CCA and include: aspects such as refreshed resilience standards (drawing on the existing Minimum Standards for London), exercising and training expectations (including unannounced and extended recovery exercises), business continuity, community engagement, peer challenge, mentoring and role of an improvement partner where needed, and the role of scrutiny/audit. The inherent tension in establishing a framework that gets the right balance between "consistency" and "local flexibility" is the challenge that stakeholders identified. There is potential learning from the Assurance Framework NHS England use to help develop, agree and implement this.
- c. **Role of the Mayor of London.** There is widespread understanding of the Mayor of London's role as the voice of London and Londoners, the strategic role in relation to civil protection, and leadership of key agencies involved, such as police, fire and transport. There is recognition that the Mayor doesn't have an operational role, but that effective communication is needed between the Mayor's Office and London Local Government during incident response and recovery, as well as continued involvement in planning and exercising.

- d. **Role of Members.** Leaders, directly elected mayors and local councillors have a key role in their boroughs for community cohesion, civic leadership, engagement and communication at the time of incidents as well as a role in ensuring London Local Government's collective preparedness and effective recovery arrangements. Currently resilience plans tend not to refer to the role of elected members and stakeholders were keen to strengthen the arrangements and be clearer about their borough role. Leaders and directly elected mayors need to be involved in supporting the role of LLAG, when appropriate, and in exercising. Plans need to be explicit about the role of members, so that this can be understood and supported by partners and the public.
- e. **Community and Communications Context.** As the nature of incidents and the context changes, so do the nature of the arrangements to deal with them. The importance of strong, effective and trusted relationships between councils and the communities they serve has never been more important. Local ownership and priority for these arrangements is crucial, as a priority for both officers and councillors. The resilience arrangements themselves cannot establish these relationships, but they will make or break success at all stages of resilience – preparation, response and recovery. Boroughs need to ensure strong connections and coherence between related services, such as emergency planning, community safety, and community engagement. At the time of an incident, the dynamic of social media creates a faster moving and less controllable context, but where more trusted relationships with the community can make a big difference. These changes in the context need to be factored into planning, training and exercising across partners.
- f. **Supporting Victims and Survivors.** This is a complex area, with a range of local, regional and national agencies involved, as well as the likelihood of an international dimension where visitors are involved. Recent work nationally has recognised scope for improvement in policies and procedures for all partners, with the creation of the Victim Support Unit. Learning through the debrief process from humanitarian and welfare provision in incidents in 2017 is essential in devising future plans and exercising to ensure that the right kind of consistent support is available to those affected, for example, understanding the specific needs of victims and survivors, being able to sustain support in a situation that needs a key worker role for an extended period, being able to share information when needed and be proactive with case management across relevant partners.
- g. **Mutual Aid.** The peer challenge found a strong ethos of mutual support between boroughs at the time of incidents with good examples given of borough chief executives both proactively offering support and recognising their own need for support, and in many cases this being well supported by emergency planning officers. The handling of the Croydon floods was mentioned by a number of stakeholders as a good example. Some stakeholders suggested that there have been occasions where the arrangements felt "voluntary", with an overreliance on goodwill. Feedback to the peer review team suggested that the mutual aid provided in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower Fire was not as effective as it should have been. These issues will be explored fully in the debrief process and

public inquiry. Given the concerns about levels of capacity and loss of experience and skills within London Local Government, recommendations are made to embed the concept of collective problem solving and resource sharing as the default position in plans and to include mutual aid scenarios more prominently in exercising, including unannounced and sustained recovery exercises. Mutual aid beyond the London boundary (which is standard for the blue light services) also needs to be given a higher profile, better understood by more people and periodically exercised.

- h. Local Authority Gold and the Gold Resolution.** There are considerable strengths in the current arrangements which have worked well on numerous occasions. However, there are concerns about the loss of experienced chief executives and on occasions, there is also a need for greater clarity about the different roles of the Borough Gold, LLAG and the Chair of LAP in the context of the Gold Resolution, including extending this clarity to handling the communications and the media and to the handover from response to recovery. The peer challenge identified an appetite to quickly strengthen the current Gold Resolution to increase the leverage of LLAG, through the LAP Chair, and to provide a more proactive and speedy response in exceptional circumstances, for example, when a borough needs help but does not request it.
- i. Working with Resilience Partners.** The peer challenge heard of good working arrangements between resilience partners in boroughs and at a regional level, with plans at a regional level strong. The faith sector reported their increasing role, with strong relationships at a regional level and developing relationships in each borough. The voluntary sector likewise highlighted the role they can play in strategic direction and operational delivery for humanitarian and welfare support. Some feedback also suggested that information sharing is an issue that needs to be worked through, though others felt it works well. A number of stakeholders felt that improvements could be made in learning lessons. Learning from Manchester suggests that having standing arrangements for the civic and charitable aspects is helpful, as well as the potential for more learning across combined authority areas drawing on the role of Metro Mayors as part of national developments being driven by Cabinet Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. Commitment to regular cross-partnership exercising is essential to embed lessons learned, and this activity needs to extend more into the recovery phase of incidents. The peer challenge heard that the new London Resilience Group (LRG) support arrangements for LLAG were not yet fully embedded, and that the development of the service level agreement could be a useful way to ensure a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities.
- j. Councils as the “fourth” emergency service.** In effect London local government should be viewed by the resilience partners as the “fourth” emergency service. A simpler understanding of incidents under three categories – borough incident, borough incident with London-wide implications, and an incident affecting more than one borough over several days or even weeks – would be better understood by people not expert in resilience but vital in an emergency, such as the broader workforce, councillors and the community.

Levels of Local Authority Response



Recommendations:

Recommendation 1 – Refresh EP2020 to incorporate the work of the independent peer challenge, into an agreed **implementation plan**. Council leaders, directly elected mayors and chief executives should provide clear leadership for resilience (including through active engagement in training and exercising) to ensure the effectiveness of arrangements in all boroughs for even the most significant test and thereby provide a robust annual assurance to key national and regional partners. In the revised EP2020, ensure clarity of accountability at borough, sub-regional and regional level, and incorporate robust monitoring arrangements and regular communications updates (to all involved) about progress. Consider any additional investment (for example: funding, secondments etc) to deliver these plans, especially the focus on sub-regional arrangements, and ensure any funds are put to good use and that support at the different levels is linked and coordinated and doesn't undermine the strength of borough arrangements.

Recommendation 2 – Reaffirm the Local Authorities' Panel (LAP) and Implementation Group as the accountable bodies to drive the refreshed EP2020 Implementation Plan with the immediate priority of **clarifying, simplifying and strengthening the sub-regional arrangements** with the lead chief executive for each area being more widely recognised and supported by the central capacity. Consider leadership development for those involved and ensure good engagement and involvement with a wider cohort of senior borough staff, emergency planning teams, councillors and partners. Use this engagement to help rebuild any confidence that has been dented by the events of 2017. Use the LAP to bring coherence to the sub-regional arrangements, and ensure effective connection to the London Resilience Forum (LRF). Ensure that there is clarity for borough or sub-regional lead roles for capabilities in response or recovery, for example, humanitarian support, rehousing. Use experienced chief executives to mentor and support less experienced chief executives. Consider the extent of collaboration that is possible between emergency planning teams, to build on arrangements that work well, as some stakeholders suggested there is scope for

more collaboration as one way of dealing with reduced capacity and an ageing workforce in this area.

Recommendation 3 - Draw together existing work to develop and implement a clear **assurance framework** to set expected and consistent standards at borough and regional levels and provide an annual assurance statement to key regional partners (through the LRF) and national partners. Utilise peer challenge and improvement partner arrangements to ensure all boroughs operate to a high and consistent standard with the right level of capability and capacity. This framework needs to be rooted in the requirements of the CCA and cover borough level assurance – about organisational priority, capacity for preparation (especially partnership working, business continuity, training, exercising and community resilience), response (especially the first 24 hour period after an incident) and recovery arrangements; propose arrangements for independent testing and assurance; ensure a degree of consistency about workforce planning (capacity) and workforce development (capability) of emergency planning officers and the broader workforce so there is clarity on roles; Minimum Standards for London need to be refreshed, learning from recent incidents, and with a focus on testing these through exercising rather than a “tick box” response and being clear about the role of councillors to oversee local preparedness. There should be at least one major London-wide exercise a year, with lessons being reported through the assurance report. Use LAP and LAPIG to work through the balance between standardisation and flexibility so that there is ownership of this framework.

Recommendation 4 – Ensure boroughs recognise the importance of community resilience and have **clear community engagement and liaison plans** in place, with strong relationships across each sector, that are well connected to emergency arrangements. Ensure that boroughs understand the impact of incidents (both local and other) on their communities. Test the robustness of these plans and arrangements locally with key community and faith groups. These arrangements will work best in the context of a borough which has an ongoing proactive focus and ethos of community engagement which builds and develops trust, confidence and relationships over time and thereby provides resilience at a time of adversity. Debriefs from 2017 incidents will inform this work.

Recommendation 5 - Ensure learning from the experiences of the humanitarian and welfare response in 2017 provided to **victims and survivors** by reviewing current plans and exercising. The peer challenge identified the following issues to be addressed: the robustness of the initial response; arrangements for longer term response; information sharing; a consistent approach to case management; the role, nature and approach of the key worker; achieving consistency of service over a prolonged period; specialist skills; clear well understood and published arrangements for a standing charity for effective collection and distribution to those affected by tragedies; and co-ordination across agencies.

Recommendation 6 – Formally recognise in plans the **role of Mayor of London as the voice of London and Londoners**, and his strategic role in relation to civil protection rather than having a direct operational role. Ensure that there is awareness and understanding of these roles and responsibilities, documented in plans and tested through exercising. Ensure that there is good two way communications during incident response and recovery, whether that is through Borough Gold, LLAG or the LAP Chair in exceptional cases.

Recommendation 7 – Develop and **agree the role of councillors and directly elected mayors** in preparedness (including an assurance role through Scrutiny and Audit Committees), and in response and recovery (including a community leadership role rather than a direct operational role). Engage councillors in developing these roles and ensure training and awareness programmes are rolled out and that councillors are periodically involved in exercising. Leaders and directly elected mayors need to be involved in supporting the role of LLAG, when appropriate.

Recommendation 8 – Enhance the **mutual aid policy** (which is underpinned by the memorandum of understanding) covering both front line resources and senior expert support so it works more effectively in practice on a more consistent and coordinated basis, especially after the initial borough response. These documents need to set out collective problem solving and resource sharing as the default approach, especially in prolonged or resource intensive incidents and be exercised (including major incidents, unannounced table top exercises and sustained recovery periods) and better understood by partners. Ensure that this approach is embedded into borough and partnership plans by a clear articulation of assets (for example: rest centres and mortuaries) and capabilities (for example: humanitarian and welfare support) and well understood through testing and exercising the recovery phase and sustained mutual aid scenarios. Establish resources to support operation of a collective response, for example, a shared case management system, the role of key workers and the role of community volunteers. Ensure there is knowledge and understanding of mutual aid beyond the boundary of the capital that is regularly tested, in line with how blue light services operate. Learning from Manchester, suggests that it is helpful to agree an approach to having standing arrangements collecting and distributing charity funds for tragedies and clarity to deal with civic issues in an appropriate manner.

Recommendation 9 - Refresh the Gold Resolution and Addendum at the earliest opportunity to make triggers and the **escalation process** clearer, so that there is a clear mandated process in the extreme circumstances that demand it. Use the role of the LAP Chair (and engagement with relevant members of London Councils' Executive) to facilitate speedy "intervention" in those exceptional cases (for example, when a borough needs help but does not request it). Once developed, ensure this is well understood by all involved and embedded into council and partnership plans, and that it features in exercising (including no notice exercises).

Recommendation 10 - Engage with LRF to **simplify joint plans and ensure effective support arrangements between blue light partners and boroughs**. Recommend that the LLAG reduce the categories of scenarios: borough incident, borough incident with London-wide implications, and an incident affecting more than one borough over several days or even weeks. This would enable plans to be better understood by people not expert in resilience but vital in an emergency. Consider optimum support arrangements so that there is clarity between the role of the London Resilience Group (in initiating the London Local Authority Control Centre - LLACC), London Councils and individual borough support for example, emergency planning and communications.

Recommendation 11 – Engage **central government departments** to secure a single and efficient point of contact through the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government for headline data and communication, for quick response funding such as Bellwin, and for “VIP” visits to incidents. Use this peer challenge to provide an impetus to share the good work being done across London Local Government and the learning from 2017 (for example: information sharing). Continue to engage and collaborate with others outside the capital, for example, with the 100 Resilience Cities network through Manchester, and influence the national policy through the work being done by Cabinet Office, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Central Government, the Local Government Association and the Society of Local Government Chief Executives.

Conclusion:

21. In conclusion the peer challenge team was impressed by the strong commitment and the openness to ongoing learning and improvement, but there needs to be an assurance that this extends to all boroughs more consistently. The London Local Government collective resilience arrangements operate in a dynamic, complex and often testing environment and they have evolved over time in response to experience in exercising and in live incidents. The arrangements form a sound basis for further development and implementing this package of recommendations with pace will enable London Local Government to provide a more robust assurance about their collective arrangements. In particular, this will include an annual assurance report about the robustness of borough arrangements and operating more effectively via the Gold Resolution in exceptional cases where the situation demands it.
 22. Crucially, all partners need to ensure that plans and procedures are simple, clear, and therefore more accessible to those who are not experts in resilience but vital in an emergency.
 23. Finally, in light of the outcome of further debriefs, the various inquiries and from further community engagement, it will be important to review and enhance the implementation plan developed in light of this peer challenge, to ensure that all lessons are learned from the events of 2017.
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Appendix 1

Documents reviewed included:

- London Resilience Partnership – Strategic Co-ordination Protocol
- LESLP – Major Incident Procedure Manual
- Major Incident Local Authorities’ Panel - EP2020
- Local Authorities’ Panel – Business Plan
- London Mass Evacuation Plan
- London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) operating procedure
- London Local Authorities Mutual Aid – Memorandum of Understanding
- Gold Resolution and Addendum
- Sample SLA for Sub-Regional Grouping
- Relevant GLA Oversight Committee transcripts (from LRG evidence and Grenfell Recovery Team)
- Minimum Standards for London, Reporting Template and sample reports
- Lord Harris Review – London’s Preparedness to a major terrorist incident – 2016
- SOLACE & MHCLG guidance
- Cabinet Office – Concept of Operations
- Observed the webcast of GLA Overview Committee Review of evidence session – Nov 2017

Appendix 2**Stakeholders interviewed or submitted written responses:**

Cllr Claire Kober	Chair of London Councils / Leader of Haringey
Cllr Peter John OBE	Deputy Chair London Councils / Leader of Southwark
Cllr Teresa O'Neill OBE	Vice Chair London Councils / Leader of Bexley
Cllr Lib Peck	Executive member for crime and public protection / Leader of Lambeth
John Barradell	Town clerk – City of London Corporation / Chair of Local Authorities' Panel (LAP) / Vice-Chair of London Resilience
John O'Brien	Chief Executive - London Councils
Doug Patterson	Chief Executive – Bromley / member of LAP
Lesley Seary	Chief Executive – Islington / Chair of Chief Executives London Committee (CELC) / member of LAP
Eleanor Kelly	Chief Executive – Southwark / member of LAP
Charlie Parker	Chief Executive – Westminster / Chair of LAP Implementation Group (LAP IG)
Stuart Love	Deputy Chief Executive and Executive Director for City Management and Communities – City of Westminster
Andrew Meek	Head of Organisational Resilience – Haringey / Practitioner Advisor to Chair of LAP
Mark Wolski	Interim Emergency Management and Response Manager – Hillingdon
Jo Couzens	Emergency Planning Lead – Lambeth / LAP IG Member
Gary Locker	Head of Resilience – City of London Corporation / LAP IG Member
Heather Wills & Andrew Pritchard	Interim Director of Local Services – Kensington and Chelsea & Consultant – Kensington and Chelsea, deputising for the Chief Executive of Kensington & Chelsea – Barry Quirk (formerly Chief Executive of Lewisham)
Chris Naylor	Chief Executive – Barking and Dagenham
Martin Esom	Chief Executive – Waltham Forest
Paul Najsarek	Chief Executive – Ealing
Tim Shields	Chief Executive – Hackney
Carolyn Downs	Chief Executive – Brent
Michael Lockwood	Chief Executive – Harrow
Sara Sutton	Director of Public Protection & Licensing – City of Westminster

Deborah Collins	Strategic Director of Environment & Leisure – Southwark
Warren Shadbolt	Assistant Director of Safer and Stronger Communities – Sutton
Keith Townsend	Executive Director of Environment & Customer Services – Ealing
Paul Moore	Director of Regeneration, Communities and Customer Services – Bexley
Emma Spragg & Christina Dalton	Director for London, Independent Living and Crisis Response & Emergency Response Operations Manager – British Red Cross
The Ven. Luke Miller	The Archdeacon of London
Joanne Roney	Chief Executive – Manchester City Council
Dr Kathryn Oldham OBE	Chief Resilience Officer – Greater Manchester Combined Authority
Fiona Twycross AM	Chair of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority and London Resilience Forum
David Bellamy	Chief of Staff – Greater London Authority
Patricia Gallan & Dawn Morris	Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime and Operations & Superintendent – Metropolitan Police Service
Steve Apter	Director of Safety & Assurance – London Fire Brigade, for Dany Cotton, Commissioner
Gill McManus & Katherine Richardson	Resilience and Emergencies Division – MHCLG
Katharine Hammond & Adam Robson	Civil Contingencies Secretariat – Cabinet Office
Peter Boorman	Regional Lead for Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response – NHS England
Piali Das Gupta	Head of Policy – SOLACE
Steve Hamm	Head of London Resilience Forum Programmes
John Hetherington	Deputy Head of London Resilience Group
Toby Gould	Deputy Head of London Resilience Group
Mark Sawyer	City of London Corporation
Jennifer Sibley	London Councils
London Councils Chief Executives meeting - 15 December 2017	
Local Authorities' Panel Implementation Group – 24 January 2018	

Appendix 3:

Short biographies of Peer Review Team, with a brief focus on credentials for this task.

Mary Ney

More than 40 years' experience in London Local Government including 24 years as a chief officer. Currently acting as Lead Government Commissioner for Rotherham MBC; a Non-Executive Director on the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government Ministerial Board; and a Consultant in Local Government. Mary brings a wealth of resilience and emergency planning at various boroughs and at a London-wide level, including undertaking LLAG role (eg post Tsunami, during 7/7 London bombings and 2014 flooding) and Borough Gold when Lee Rigby was murdered; helping to develop LA Gold and Gold Resolution; involvement in exercises, the LRF and a variety of incidents and event planning; and being a member of the City Operations Steering Group for London 2012.

Tom Riordan

Tom spent time as a Senior Civil Servant covering a range of policy areas, before moving to lead Yorkshire Forward. Since being Chief Executive of Leeds City Council, he drove the Commission that set out in 2012 a new "civic enterprise blueprint" for the Future of Local Government. Since 2010, he has overseen £180million of efficiency savings across the organisation, pioneer status for the city's health and social care work, transformation of the council's Children's Services to the praise of Ofsted with Leeds rated "good" with "outstanding" leadership in 2015. He is a trustee on the Centre for Cities Board and Chair of the Core Cities Chief Executives Group. Tom was awarded Yorkshire Man of the Year 2017 for his commitments to the city and wider county. Tom's experience of resilience and emergencies was a leadership role during extensive flooding in Yorkshire; whilst at Leeds there have been a range of issues such as the murder of a school teacher, major flooding, and the implications of terror attacks where Tom has played a key leadership role.

Mariana Pexton

Mariana was a Civil Servant prior to joining Leeds City Council in 2000. She has been Chief Customer Services Officer, Deputy Director of Children's Services and is now Chief Officer Strategy and Improvement at Leeds City Council. Mariana supports the Chief Executive, and the wider Corporate Leadership Team, and Councillors, to deliver better outcomes in the city. Mariana provides leadership of the council's corporate support functions including communications, intelligence, business improvement, shared services, and emergency planning. Mariana played a leading role in supporting the Commission on the Future of Local Government in 2012 and in following through the actions to deliver change. Mariana is a trustee of Leeds Rugby Foundation. Mariana has lead the resilience agenda in Leeds for about three years, and is a member of the West Yorkshire Resilience Forum. During that time, there have been the usual range of incidents to deal with, plus major incidents such as the murder of a school teacher in Leeds, major flooding and the implications of terror attacks.

Appendix 4:

A brief explanation of how the LLAG arrangements have been applied to demonstrate the flexible and scalable response mechanism:

Severe Snow 2009/2010 - In 2009/10 the national and London salt stocks used to grit roads and keep London moving was depleted. With no assurance of re-supply LLAG was activated and chaired London Resilience Partnership meetings attended by key stakeholders including TfL, the health sector and GLA. LLAG made a number of strategic decisions, following consultation with London Councils and all London chief executives, including the reduction of the London-wide gritting service to a resilience network of key roads, a minimum level of salt to be held by each borough based on length of resilience network, a strategic re-supply operation supported by TfL for national salt stock arriving in London and the need for all boroughs to share salt by means of mutual aid if available. As a result of these decisions and the coordinated and consistent approach adopted by all boroughs, and although there were challenges in negotiations and co-ordination, no one ran out and London kept moving.

Croydon Floods in 2014 - The risk of flooding from the Caterham Bourne was identified by Croydon Council in January 2014. A local multi-agency Gold strategic group was established chaired by the council's chief executive. Due to prolonged efforts to mitigate the risk of flooding which could affect several thousand homes, the council's local command and control functions were set up bolstered by mutual aid for key response functions coordinated via the team which delivers the LLAC. The duty LLAG was continually updated on and maintained a watching brief in case wider support be required. In case the need to evacuate become a reality, a protocol was agreed between Croydon Council and the Metropolitan Police Service whereby coordination of the multi-agency response would transfer. Following further significant rainfall and storm damage the decision to evacuate was made, the MPS accepted responsibility and due to the high likelihood that Croydon Council would require additional assistance from other local authorities, LLAG was activated and attended the MPS special operations room at Lambeth. This left the Croydon chief executive in Croydon to oversee the council's local response and deployment of mutual aid should it have been needed. Fortunately prior to implementing the evacuation plan the decision was rescinded and the MPS and LLAG stepped down leaving Croydon Council to consider leading the response at the local level with another chief executive (Bexley) being appointed to undertake the Gold Recovery role.

London Bridge Attack 2017 - Immediately after the vehicle and knife attack on London Bridge and in Borough Market it was clear that two boroughs were affected, the City of London Corporation and London Borough of Southwark. To coordinate the response the MPS chaired strategic coordination group meetings, with strategic level representatives from the City and Southwark, and with LLAG dialling into the teleconferences for the first two days. This was in recognition that this attack had occurred just a few weeks after the terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge, the Manchester Bombing and a 'move to critical'. Concerns existed about the cumulative effect and potential increased community tensions. Additionally the numbers of people affected and the significant media interest could have resulted in requests for support and with LLAG being sighted on discussions, this London-wide support could have more easily been coordinated, if required. That said, following

confirmation that tensions had not increased beyond acceptable levels and it being clear that Southwark had the resources to deal with ongoing demands, LLAG stood down.
